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Introduction
Initiatives aiming to improve the ongoing professionalization of boards with respect to its monitoring and advising competences and in particular the role of nonexecutive outside directors on the board are debated at national levels, as well as at a supranational level by the European Commission. The discussion is accompanied and supported by a wide and growing body of theoretical and empirical research in the field of corporate governance and management (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . Evaluating the effects of outsiders on the board the literature generally provides two diverging theoretical explanations. First, outsiders could mitigate the monitoring intensity. This may be due to a lack of firm-specific knowledge regarding internal processes, strategy or a firm's environment (e.g. Aghion, The present study aims to contribute to extend the current state of research by taking into account the moderating role of product market competition on the expected relationship between outside directors on the board and executive turnover. As a second extension of the present literature the study refers to a supranational perspective using a large panel of listed firms in 15 European member states plus Norway and Switzerland.
This cross-country perspective accounts for institutional and legal differences of board structures in different countries allowing us to derive broader and more generalizable implications.
In line with previous studies proportional hazard estimations show that outside directors on the board increase the risk of executive turnover what generally points to intensified monitoring. Further, outsiders significantly increase the performanceturnover sensitivity of executives. Accounting for competition intensity which was calculated on the basis of firm-specific Lerner indices we find that the positive relation between outsiders and monitoring is exclusively significant in the case of weak product market competition. We interpret this finding as evidence that effective competition substitutes for monitoring of outside directors. High competition in a market seems to effectively limit managerial discretion for opportunistic behavior, in so far as the pressure associated with competition forces managers to maximize firm value in the interests of shareholders. However, in situations of weak competition monitoring capacities of outside directors seem to be a crucial mechanism of corporate governance. In the next section the theoretical considerations and previous related empirical results are discussed. Section 3 provides an overview on the institutional framework, 4 data sources and descriptive results. In section 4 the econometric set-up is introduced and main findings based on proportional hazard estimations are provided. The concluding section 5 discusses implications for business practice and policy-makers.
Theoretical Considerations and Previous Empirical Findings
During the last decades, various studies have examined the importance of certain board characteristics for firm behavior and outcomes. A recent comprehensive summary is provided by Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) . Among other factors, research has focused on the role of board size (Yermack, 1996) , staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) , CEO-chairman duality (Goyal and Park, 2002) Chen, 1996). Another distinct feature of board composition is the presence of nonexecutive outside directors in the boardroom. This empirical phenomenon has long been the subject of debate in the political discourse and is experiencing growing attention in economic research. In the literature conflicting approaches are brought forward to explain the relevance of outside directors for monitoring. It is argued that multiple directorships reflect the outstanding and scarce skills and experiences of top-managers in a concentrated labor market (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Since only a limited number of suitable candidates meet the high requirements, firms aim to co-opt these individuals to the board. Building on a principal-agent perspective, outside directors act as intermediates to align the interests of the incumbent management and shareholders.
Typical agency problems refer to management remuneration and executive appointment 5 or replacement decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, 1998 Theoretical considerations could also derive negative aspects of multiple directorships if outsiders actually enhance agency problems of a firm. In particular, opportunistic behavior of outside directors could stem from conflicts of interests between supervisors and shareholders. Conyon and Read (2006) show that directors have incentives for exaggerated board seat accumulation to increase additional payments and to realize non-pecuniary benefits, e.g. influence, prestige or social status (Yermack, 2004 or Useem and Karabel, 1986) . With an increasing number of simultaneous board mandates directors are prevented from conscientiously performing their duties in the respective firms resulting in an extenuated rate of control intensity (2011) finds evidence that competition positively influences management quality which in turn increases productivity. This selection of more able managers in competitive environments should result in higher management quality with a lower probability of executive replacements and weaker need for monitoring by outsiders. Table I describes all variables that have been used in this study and refers to the corresponding sources.
(Table I: Variable definitions and data sources)
During the data cleansing process all subsidiaries which are majority owned by a global parent company were excluded. The assumption behind this approach is that subsidiaries' actions, like the decision to replace incumbent managers, are often presumably determined by the ultimate owner. Financial services providers were removed to provide appropriate comparability of financial information among the sample firms. After the final correction for missing values, the baseline panel includes 3,369 different European listed firms with a total of 18,369 executive directors and 61,254 associated person-year observations during the sample period. The distribution of firms and executive directors by country is summarized in Table II .
(Table II: Pooled distribution by country)
Further, the number of executive director spells is with a value of 18,862 larger than the number of individual directors indicating a number of follow-up spells among the sample firms. In sum, we observe 6,665 failure events. Average executive tenure amounts to 4.5 years. Table I In the empirical estimations we apply a set of variables to examine the influence of firm performance on executive turnover. At this we rely primarily on accountingbased measures of corporate performance like return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) or return on capital employed (ROCE) which are identified to be more appropriate predictors of management turnover than stock price performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . However, in alternative regressions we also use Tobin's Q as an indicator for market-based performance.
Another widely used predictor of director turnover is the capital structure. It is argued that capital control is relatively weak in the absence of large blockholders increasing executives' discretion for opportunistic behavior (Balsmeier, Buchwald, and Dilger, forthcoming). To account for ownership dispersion, we use a dummy variable (Block) if one or more shareholders own a fraction of at least 25 % of the voting rights (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009 ). The ratio of debt to equity (Debt Equity Ratio) controls for firm leverage. Firm size is measured by the number of Employees. In line with the literature, we expect that the size of the board of directors might have an influence on the monitoring intensity (Yermack, 1996) . We distinguish between the number of executive directors (No. Executives) and the number of non-executive monitoring
directors (No. Non-Executives).
We rely on the work of Aghion et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996) to calculate a widely accepted indicator for product market competition. The competition measure is based on the Lerner Indices, a price cost margin that was available for about 730.000 
Empirical Results

Basic Model
We adopt semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard estimations to model the impact of different factors on the probability of executive failure events. Duration analyses are a suitable econometric approach to take account of the specific spellstructure of the data at hand. In particular, the Cox proportional hazard model is useful to handle right-censored data, meaning that an executive is still in office at the end of 
Executive Turnover and Product Market Competition
The previous results have shown that executive replacements are more sensitive to First, executive turnover is less frequently with higher return on assets and second, executives are more likely to be replaced in the case of below-average returns.
However, the comparison between the subsamples for high and low competition illustrates that the finding is driven by firms in environments with low competition.
These results support the assumption that monitoring executed by outside directors is 16 particularly valuable in the absence of effective competition. Conversely, fierce competition associated with a higher pressure to maximize profits seems to act as an alternative mechanism of executive control.
Further Robustness Checks
As an additional robustness check Table VII repeats the previous subsample estimations using different performance measures. Supplementary to return on assets we tested the below-average dummies for return on equity, return on capital employed and Tobin's Q to measure stock price performance. The isolated effect of the respective variables is positive and significant for the observations with high competition reflecting that executive replacement decisions seem to be related to financial performance for these firms. In the subsample for low competition we find only weak evidence in the case of return on equity. Interestingly, below-average market performance has no significant effect in the case of high competition and even a negative and significant effect in industries with low competition. This finding appears to be puzzling given that lower stock price performance increases executive duration pointing to a lower market value orientation if product market competition is rather low. 
Discussion
This paper aims to contribute to the current debate on efficient board composition by empirically analyzing the influence of non-executive outside directors on the board of a large sample of European firms on managerial turnover. In addition to previous studies that have mainly focused on specific characteristics of outsiders, for example experiences and knowledge, time constraints or conflicts of interest, this paper addresses the moderating effect of product market competition in the relationship between outside directors and the sensitivity of turnover to corporate financial 18 performance. The rationale is that the principal-agent conflict between shareholders and management is intensified in environments of weak product market competition that encourage opportunistic behavior. In such an environment, independent outside monitoring directors should be of particular importance for a firm's corporate governance. In fiercely competitive markets, the higher threat of bankruptcy or hostile takeover sets incentives for managers to behave in the interest of shareholders.
The empirical results clearly suggest that outside directors and product market competition are substitutes. We find that the presence of outside directors on the board increases the risk of executive turnover. However, the influence of outsiders on the performance-turnover sensitivity of executives is positive and significant if competition in the industry is relatively low. For observations in markets with high competition, the interaction is insignificant. In addition, we do not find that competition has an impact on Assessing the results from the point of view of competition policy, the development of inter-firm relationships via multiple directorships does not point to intensified collusion. It is argued that personal interlocks may facilitate informal coordination or illegal agreements between competitors or in the case of vertical relations (Buchwald, forthcoming; Mizruchi, 1996) . If this is true, one would expect -if at all -a decrease in executive fluctuation. Indeed, the issue of outside directorships is also relevant in the context of the current consultation on merger control by the European Commission (2013). In this context it might be possible that director linkages are a mechanism to exert influence on a target firm. Therefore, our findings could also reflect that firms use the potential to exert influence via outside directorships to replace incumbent managers by preferred loyal candidates. Tables   Table I: Variable definitions and data Notes: The table presents the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the study (n=61,254). Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firmlevel. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firmlevel. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firmlevel. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firmlevel. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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